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Perjury:The Lawyersiileim a

by Monroe IL Freedman
Is it ever proper for a lawyer to present perjured
testimony?
One's instinctive response is in the negative. On
analysis. however, it becomes apparent that the question
is exceedingly perplexing. In at least one situation, that
of the criminal defense lawyer, my own answer is in the
affirmative.
At the outset, we should dispose of some common
question-begging responses. The attorney, we are told, is
an officer of the court participating in a search for truth.
Those propositions, however, merely serve to state the
problem in different words: As an officer of the court,
participating in a search for truth, what is the attorney
obligated to do when faced with perjured testimony?
That question cannot be answered properly without an
appreciation of the fact that the attorney functions in an
adversary system of justice which imposes three
conflicting obligations upon the advocate. The
difficulties presented by these obligations are
particularly acute in the criminal defense area because of
the presumption of innocence, the burden on the state to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the right to
put the prosecution to its proof.
First, the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense
Function requires the lawyer to determine all relevant
facts known to the accused, because "counsel cannot
properly perform their duties without knowing the
truth." The lawyer who is ignorant of any potentially
relevant fact "incapacitates himself to serve his client
effectively," because "an adequate defense cannot be
framed if the lawyer does not know what is likely to
develop at trial."
Second, the lawyer must hold in strictest confidence
the disclosures made by the client in the course of the
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professional relationship. The Standards admonish that
"nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client
relationship than the establishment of trust and
confidence," and that the "first duty" of an attorney is
"to keep the secrets of his clients." If this were not so, the
client would not feel free to confide fully, and the lawyer
would not be able to fulfill the obligation to ascertain all
relevant facts. Accordingly, counsel is required to
establish a relationship of trust and confidence, to
explain the necessity of full disclosure of all facts, and to
explain to the client the obligation of confidentiality
which makes privileged the accused's disclosures.
Third, Canon 22 of the Canons of ProfessionalEthics
tells us that the lawyer is an officer of the court, and his
or her conduct before the court "should be characterized
by candor."

Defining the Trilemma
As soon as one begins to think about those
responsibilities, it becomes apparent that the
conscientious attorney is faced with what we may call a
trilemma-that is, the lawyer is required to know
everything, to keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the
court.
Before addressing the issue of the lawyer's responsibilities when the client indicates to the lawyer the
intention to commit perjury in the future, we might note
the somewhat less difficult question of what the lawyer
should do when knowledge of the perjury comes after its
commission rather than before it. The relevant provision
of the new Code of Professional Responsibility is
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). As originally drafted, in
1969, that provision is in two clauses-a main clause and
an "an4 if" clause. The main clause provides that when
the lawyer learns that a client has "perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal," the lawyer "shall promptly
call upon his client to rectify" the fraud. The second
clause reads: "and if his client refuses or is unable to do
so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or

)6

tribunal." Thus. the American Bar Association at first
took a position unambiguously in favor of disclosure by
the lawyer contrary to the client's interest and in
violation of confidentiality.
The District of Columbia was the first jurisdiction in
the United States in which the practicing bar focused
upon that particular provision and passed judgment
upon it specifically. On my motion. DR 7-102(B)(I) was
amended when the Code was adopted in the District to

delete the "and it" clause entirely. On a mail referendum
of the bar, the amendment carried by seventy-four
percent of the vote. or virtually three to one. Similarly.,
the Quebec Bar Association, which has adopted
substantial portions of the ABA Code, has rejected DR
7-102(B)(I). In addition, the Law Society, which oversees
the conduct of solicitors in England, has taken the
position that a solicitor must maintain confidentiality
even upon learning from the client after the conclusion of
a civil case that a witness has been paid by the client to
commit perjury. Finally, the ABA itself recognized the
inlproprietv of requiring a breach of confidentiality. In
1974, the ABA added a third clause to DR 7-102(B)(1),
so that the attorney is called upon to reveal the client's
fraud "except when the information is protected as a
privileged communication."
Entirely apart from any consensus of the bar relative to
civil practice, however, divulgence by the defense
attorney in a criminal case would be controlled by such
constitutional provisions as the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by
jury and the right to due process. The ABA Code. even in
the original draft of DR 7-102(B)(I), states flatly that
that provision 'is construed as not embracing the giving
of false testimony in a criminal case." That is, even in
those jurisdictions that may not yet have adopted the
ABA's amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1), that clause does
not apply to the criminal defense lawyer.

Misleading First Reading
Where the lawyer has foreknowledge of perjury,
another section of the Code appears, at first reading, to
be unambiguous. According to DR 7-102(A)(4), a lawyer
must not "knowingly use perjured testimony or false
evidence." The difficulty, however, is that the Code does
not indicate how the lawyer is to go about fulfilling that
obligation. What it' the lawyer advises the client that
perjury is unlawful and, perhaps, bad tactics as well, but
the client nevertheless insists upon taking the stand and
committing perjury? What steps, specifically, should the
lawyer take? Just how difficult it is to answer that
question becomes apparent if we review the relationship
between lawyer and client as it develops, and consider the
contexts in which the decision to commit perjury may
arise.
If we recognize that professional responsibility
requires that an advocate have full knowledge of every
pertinent fact. then the lawyer must seek the truth from
the client, not shun it. That means that the attorney will
have to dig and pry and cajole, and, even then, the lawyer
will not be successful without convincing the client that
full disclosure to the lawyer will never result in prejudice

to the client by any word or action of the attorney. That is
particularly true in the case of the indigent criminal
defendant, who meets the lawyer for the first time in the
cell block or the rotunda of the jail. The client did not
choose the lawyer, who comes as a stranger sent by the
judge and who therefore appears to be part of the system
that is attempting to punish the defendant. It is no easy
task to persuade such a client to talk freely without fear
of harm.
However, the inclination to mislead one's lawyer is not
restricted to the indigent or even to the criminal
defendant. Randolph Paul has observed a similar
phenomenon among a wealthier class in a far more
congenial atmosphere. The tax adviser, notes Mr. Paul,
will sometimes have to "dynamite the facts of his case out
of the unwilling witnesses on his own side-witnesses
who are nervous, witnesses who are confused about their
own interest, witnesses who try to be too smart for their
own good, and witnesses who subconsciously do not want
to understand what has happened despite the fact that
they must if they are to testify coherently." Mr. Paul goes
on to explain that the truth can be obtained only by
persuading the client that it would be a violation of a
sacred obligation for the lawyer ever to reveal a client's
confidence. Of course, once the lawyer has thus
persuaded the client of the obligation of confidentiality,
that obligation must be respected scrupulously.

Illustrating the Trilemma
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Assume the following situation. Your client has been

falsely accused of a robbery committed at 16th and P
Streets at 11:00 p.m. He reveals to you that he was at
15th and P Streets at 10:55 that evening, but that he was
walking cast, away from the scene of the crime, and that,
by 11:00 p.m.. hc was six blocks away. At the trial, there
are two prosecution witnesses. The first mistakenly, but
with some degree of persuasiveness, identifies your client
as the criminal. The second prosecution witness is an
elderly woman who is somewhat nervous and who wears
glasses. She testifies truthfully and accurately that she
saw your client at 15th and P Streets at 10:55 p.m. She
has corroborated the erroneous testimony of the first
witness and made conviction extremely likely.
The client then insists upon taking the stand in his
own defense, not only to deny the erroneous evidence
identifying him as the criminal, but also to deny the
truthful, but highly damaging, testimony of the
corroborating witness who placed him one block away
from the intersection five minutes prior to the crime. Of
course, it' he tells the truth and thus verifies the
corroborating witness, the jury will be more inclined to
accept the inaccurate testimony of the principal witness,
who specifically identified him as the criminal.
In my opinion, the attorney's obligation in such a
situation would be to advise the client that the proposed
testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the normal
fashion in presenting the testimony and arguing the case
to the jury if the client makes the decision to go forward.
Any other course would be a betrayal of the assurances of
confidentiality given by the attorney to induce the client
to reveal everything, however damaging it might appear.
A frequent objection to the position that the attorney
must go along with the client's decision to commit
perjury is that the lawyer would be guilty of subornation
of perjury. Subornation. however, consists of willfully
procuring perjury, which is not the case when the
attorney indicates to the client that the client's proposed
course of conduct would be unlawful, but then accepts
the client's decision. Beyond that. there is a point of view,
which has been expressed to me by a number of
experienced attorneys, that the criminal defendant has a
"right to tell his story." What that suggests is that it is
simply too much to expect of a human being, caught up
in the criminal process and facing loss of liberty and the
horrors of' imprisonment, not to attempt to lie to avoid
that penalty. For that reason, criminal defendants in
most European countries do not testify under oath. but
simply "tell their stories." It is also noteworthy that
subs quent perjury prosecutions against criminal
defendants in this country are extremely rare, being used
almost exclusively in cases in which the prosecutor's
motive is questionable.
Collateral Witnesses
The discussion thus far has focused only on the
lawyer's obligation when the perjury is presented by the
client. Some authorities indicate a distinction between
peijury by the criminal defendant who has a right to take
the stand, and perjury by collateral witnesses. I agree
that there is an important distinction, and that the case
involving collateral witnesses is not at all as clear as that
involving the client alone. In one criminal case, however,

a new trial was ordered when the trial court discovered
that the defendant's attorney had refused to put on the
defendant's mother and sister because he was concerned
about perjury. Certainly a spouse or parent would be
acting under the same human compulsion as a
defendant, and I find it difficult to imagine myself
denouncing my client's spouse or parent as a perjurer
and, thereby, denouncing my client as well. I do not
know, however, how much wider that circle of close
identity might be drawn.
The most obvious way to avoid the ethical difficulty of
the trilemma is for the lawyer to withdraw from the case,
at least if there is sufficient time before trial for the client
to retain another attorney. The client will then go to the
nearest law office, realizing that the obligation of
confidentiality is not what it has been represented to be
and withhold incriminating information or the fact of
guilt from the new attorney. And, of course, in a
substantial number of cases, the courts will not permit
counsel to withdraw.
In terms of professional ethics, the practice of
withdrawing from a case under such circumstances is
difficult to defend, since the identical perjured testimony
will ultimately be presented. Moreover, the new attorney
will be ignorant of the perjury and therefore will be in no
position to attempt to discourage the client from
presenting it. Only the original attorney, who knows the
truth, has that opportunity, but loses it in the very act of
evading the ethical problem.
Another unsuccessful effort to deal with the problem
appears in the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense
Function. The Standards first attempt to solve the
problem by a rhetorical attack, unsupported by practical
analysis or verificable research, upon those who are
concerned with maintaining confidentiality. Thus, the
Standards state that it has been "universally rejected by
the legal profession" that a lawyer may be excused for
acquiescing in the use of known perjured testimony on
the "transparently spurious thesis" that the principle of
confidentiality requires it. While "no honorable lawyer"
would accept that view and "every experienced advocate
can see its basic fallacy as a matter of tactics apart from
morality and law," the "mere advocacy" of such an idea
"demeans the profession and tends to drag it to the level
of gangsters and their 'mouthpiece' lawyers in the public
eye." The Standards conclude that that concept is
"universally repudiated by ethical lawyers," although
that fact does not fully repair the "gross disservice" done
by the few who are "unscrupulous" enough to practice it.
Obligations of Confidentiality
At a later point, however, the Standardsexpress a very
different assessment of lawyers' attitudes regarding
perjury by the client. Although "some lawyers" are said
to favor disclosure of the perjury, the Standards
recognize that other attorneys (not characterized in
pejorative terms) hold that the obligation of
confidentiality does not permit disclosure of the facts
learned from the client. To disclose the perjury. it is
noted, "would be inconsistent with the assurances of
confidentiality which counsel gave at the outset of the

28

lawyer-client relationship." Thus, the Standards
acknowledge a genuine "dilemma" in the forced choice
between candor and confidentiality.
Since there are actually three obligations that create
the difficulty-the third being the attorney's duty to
learn all the facts-there is, of course, another way to
resolve the difficulty. That is, by "selective ignorance."
The attorney can make it clear to the client from the
outset that the attorney does not want to hear an
admission of guilt or incriminating information from the
client. According to the Standards, that tactic is "most
egregious" and constitutes "professional impropriety."
On a practical level, it also puts an unreasonable burden
on the unsophisticated client to select what to tell and
what to hold back, and it can seriously impair the
attorney's effectiveness in counseling the client and in
trying the case.
The question remains: What should the lawyer do
when faced with the client's insistence upon taking the
stand and committing perjury? It is in response to that
question in criminal cases that the Standards present a
most extraordinary solution, which, to my knowledge,
has never been advocated by anyone other than Chief
Justice Burger (who served as chairman in preparing the
Standards): If the lawyer knows that the client intends to
commit perjury, the lawyer "must confine his
examination to identifying the witness as the defendant
and permitting him to make his statement." The lawyer
"may not engage in direct examination of the defendant
. in the conventional manner" and, moreover, "may
not later ... recite or rely upon the false testimony in his
closing argument."
It is difficult to imagine'a more unprofessional and
irresponsible proposal. The first objection is a purely
practical one: The prosecutor might well object to
testimony from the defendant in narrative form rather
than in the conventional manner, because it would give
the prosecutor no opportunity to object to inadmissible
evidence prior to the jury's hearing it. The Standards
provide no guidance as to what the defense attorney
should do if the objection is sustained.

The Jury's Assumptions
More importantly, experienced trial attorneys have
often noted that jurors assume that the defendant's
lawyer knows the truth about the case, and that the jury
will frequently judge the defendant by drawing
inferences from the attorney's conduct in the case. There
is, of course, only one inference that can be drawn if the
defendant's own attorney turns his or her back on the
defendant at the most critical point in the trial, and then,
in closing argument, sums up the case with no reference
whatsoever to the fact that the defendant has testified or
to the evidence presented in that testimony. Ironically,
the Standards reject any solution that would involve
informing the judge, but then propose a solution that, as
a practical matter, succeeds in informing not only the
judge but the jury as well.
It would appear that the ABA Standards have chosen
to resolve the trilemma by maintaining the requirements
of complete knowledge and of candor to the court, and

sacrificing confidentiality. Interestingly, however, that
may not in fact be the case. I say that because the
Standards fail to answer a critically important question:
Should the client be told about the obligation the
Standards seek to impose on the attorney? That is, the
Standards ignore the issue of whether the lawyer should
say to the client at the outset of their relationship, "I
think it's only fair that I warn you: If you should tell me
anything incriminating and subsequently decide to deny
the incriminating facts at trial, I would not be able to
examine you in the ordinary manner or to argue your
untrue testimony to the jury." The Canadian Bar
Association, for example, takes an extremely hard line
against the presentation of perjury by the client, but it
also explicitly requires that the client be put on notice of
that fact. Obviously, any other course would be a gross
betrayal of the client's trust, since everything else said by
the attorney in attempting to obtain complete
information about the case would indicate to the client
that no information thus obtained would be used to the
client's disadvantage.
On the other hand, the inevitable result of the position
taken by the Canadian Bar Association would be to
caution the client not to be completely candid with the
attorney. That, of course, returns us to resolving the
trilemma by maintaining confidentiality and candor, but
sacrificing complete knowledge-a solution which, as we
have already seen, is denounced in criminal cases by the
Standards as "unscrupulous," "most egregious," and
"professional impropriety."
Thus, the Standards, by failing to face up to the
question of whether to put the client on notice, take us
out of the trilemma by one door only to lead us back by
another.

The jury can draw only
one inference when the
attorney sums up the
case with no reference
to his client's testimony.
Earlier we noted that the Code of Professional
Responsibility appears to be unambiguous in proscribing
the known use of perjured testimony, but that the Code
does not indicate how the lawyer is to go about fulfilling
that obligation. Analysis of the various alternatives that
have been suggested shows that none of them is wholly
satisfactory, and that some are impractical and violate
basic rights of the client. In addition, the ABA Standards
rely upon unsupported assertions of what lawyers
"universally" think and do. It is therefore relevant and
important to consider the actual practices of attorneys
faced with the ethical issue in their daily work.
A survey conducted among lawyers in the District of
Columbia is extremely revealing. The overall conclusion
is that "less than five percent of practicing attorneys
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queried consistently acted in a manner the legal
professional claims that members of the Bar act, and,
under the new Code of Professional Responsibility,
demands that they act." Specifically, when asked what to
do when the client indicates an intention to commit
perjury, ninety-five percent of the attorneys responding
indicated that they would call the defendant and ninety
percent stated that they would question the witness in the
normal fashion.

A Gross Discrepancy
That rather gross discrepancy between published
standards and professional action is perhaps best
explained by attorneys' reactions to being asked to
participate in the survey. Virtually all of the attorneys
personally interviewed refused to make an on-the-record
statement, although without exception they eagerly
cooperated and were willing to participate in an
anonymous interview.
Senior partners of two of Washington's most prestigious law firms, after refusing to allow the circulation of
the questionnaire among the firm's members, permitted
personal interviews on the condition that neither their
names, names of the other members in the firm
interviewed, nor the name of their firm would be
published. Both attorneys, after apologizing for their
insistence upon anonymity, explained that many of the
local judges with whom they dealt daily would not look
favorably upon their true views about the role of the
defense attorney in a criminal case, especially if aired
publicly. Their reason for not complying with the ABA's
rules relating to the presentation of perjury was that
those standards would compromise their role as
advocates in an adversary system.

Complying with ABA
rules on presenting
perjured testimony
conflicts with the
obligation of advocates
in the adversary system.
In view of those findings, which stem in substantial
part from the impracticality of the published standards,
we might return to the relevant provisions of the Code
with a somewhat more critical eye to consider whether
the rules really mean what they appear at first reading to
say.
The cases cited by the codifiers provide important
clues as to what is intended. The strongest of the cases
against confidentiality is In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474
(Ky. 1951), which held that an attorney "should not sit by
silently and permit his client to commit what may have
been perjury, and which certainly would mislead the

court and the opposing party." Two important
observations can be made about that case. First, it was
not a criminal case, but involved a divorce. Second, the
husband, whom the attorney represented, testified that
he did not own certain property, but the same attorney
had been authorized by the husband to claim ownership
of the property in another judicial proceeding. Thus, the
bond of confidentiality had already been loosened by the
client's authorization. Third, assuming that Carrolldoes
stand as unqualified authority for divulgence, it is
significant that the case is cited as a footnote to an
Ethical Consideration (which is only "aspirational in
character") and not a Disciplinary Rule (which is
"mandatory in character," stating a "minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action"). The case citation to the
applicable Disciplinary Rule, DR 7-102, is significantly
different. That case, Hinds v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 87
(1941), also involved a divorce rather than a criminal
matter. In addition, the attorney had participated in
preparing the perjured affidavit that was at issue.
Finally, the attorney was shown to have altered the
client's deed to make the attorney's daughter a grantee
and apparently perjured himself in testifying in
connection with the disciplinary proceeding. Putting the
Carrolland Hinds cases together, therefore, we may infer
that the rule-in civil cases-is that an attorney is urged,
though not required, to divulge the client's fraud on the
other party, at least when the client has authorized
disclosure of the truth for other purposes, but the
attorney is required to divulge the client's perjury, under
sanction of disciplinary action, only when the attorney
has participated in creation of the perjury.
There is another relevant citation in the notes to
Canon 7. That case, unlike Carrolland Hinds, is a criminal case. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.Va.
1959). Johns is in a note to the opening sentence of
Ethical Consideration 7-1, which reads: "The duty of a
lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law, which includes DisciplinaryRules. . .

."

The case

held that a defendant's constitutional rights had been
violated becausi the attorney, believing his client to be
guilty, did not argue the case in the ordinary manner.
Taking into account, therefore, the lack of practical
guidance in the Code, the practical and constitutional
difficulties encountered by any of the alternatives to
strict maintenance of confidentiality, the consensus and
the practice of the bar, and the implications of Carroll,
Hinds, and Johns, which are the three key cases cited in
the notes to Canon 7, I continue to stand with those
lawyers who hold that the lawyer's obligation of
confidentiality does not permit him to disclose the facts
he has learned from his client which form the basis for
his conclusion that the client intends to perjure himself.
What that means-necessarily, it seems to me-is that,
at least the criminal defense attorney, however
unwillingly in terms of personal morality, has a professional responsibility as an advocate in an adversary
system to examine the perjurious client in the ordinary
way and to argue to the jury, as evidence in the case, the
testimony presented by the defendant.
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